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This paper presents empirical findings about the cyclical be-
havior of capacity and capacity utilization together with some ob-
servations about the causes and implications of that behavior. The
assumptions and predictions of the acceleration principle receive
particularattention.Some historical observations on capacity
growth and utilization in peacetime and wartime are also offered.
Finally it is hoped that the paper will acquaint the reader with the
available data and the conceptual problems involved in their use.
The data employed are annual estimates of capacity and production
for a group of thirteen industries.
The Concept of Capacity and the Published Estimates
Statistical measures of capacity of the type used here have three
basic characteristics.They assume (for each firm) given plant
facilities, an uninterrupted flow of variable inputs such as labor
and materials, and a "normal" organization of production.In addi-
tion they may or may not include an allowance for seasonal fluctu-
ationsin output or for unavoidable shut-downs.Usually these
latter factors are accounted for by a distinction between "theo-
retical" or "rated" capacity and "practical" capacity, where the
former is based on the first three assumptions listed above. A list
of the series used is presented in Appendix A along with the prin-
cipal characteristics of each.
Although the following discussion is couched in terms of the
individual firm, the estimates are generally available only as in-
dusty aggregates.From the viewpoint of economic analysis, the
primary attribute of the data is that they employ an engineering
Note: This paper is an expanded version of a report on research in
progress that was delivered at a round table discussion at the Conference.
The author is particularly indebted to Franco Modigliani for his criticisms
of the original report and his valuable suggestions concerning the revision.
He is also indebted to Rudolph Blitz, Robert Eisner, and Robert H. Strotz
for comments on various portions of the paper andtoDavid Slier for re-
search assistance.
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rather than a cost concept of capacity. The question posed is this:
How much physical output can be produced with a given plant under
a normal organization of production and with an uninterrupted and
unlimited how of variable inputs?Even this question cannot be
answered unambiguously in all circumstances.For example the
capacity figures for cotton-spinning, petroleum-refining, and paper-
making can vary as the specifications of the product produced vary.
Also, what is a "normal organization of production"? Thus cotton
mills can be operated for one, two, or three shifts, as the circum-
stances warrant.Fortunately this multiple-shift problem is elimi-
nated in most of the series used since the majority of the products
areproducedunderconditionsofcontinuoustwenty-four-hour
operation.
What restrictions does the noncost character of the data place on
their usefulness to the analyst? As is usually the case, the answer
depends in considerable part on the purpose of the analyst.If he
is interested in quantitative analysis of the efficiency of allocation
of resources, his concern is precisely with the cost concept of ca-
pacity, and engineering data are practically useless—unless a
precise relationship between the engineering and cost estimates
can be established.Nevertheless there are certain definite and
important parallels between the cost and engineering concepts. As
a matter of fact the subsequent discussion will show that there is
no essential dichotomy between the two concepts in qualitative
terms.
in discussions of resource allocation, the usual practice is to
define capacity as that output which may be produced at minimum
average total cost, when the prices of resources and the production
function of the firm are given.As long as the cost function is
fixed, the capacity of the firm is fixed.The actual output of the
firm may exceed or fall short of the capacity output—that is, ca-
pacity utilization may be greater or less than 100percent—but
with free entry and exit in a competitive industry overutilization
and underutilization would tend to be eliminated in the long run.
Since primary interest isin long-run phenomena, abstraction is
usually made from seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in defining
the cost function.In fact only two types of change in the cost
function (and hence in capacity) are admitted to the analysis: struc-
tural changes in factor prices which reflect changes in the relative
valuations of resources in alternative employments, and changes in
the production function. The first type of change has no analog in
the engineering concept of capacity (except insofar as the engi-
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neering capacity is altered by changes in the organization of pro-
duction induced by price changes) but the latter type does since
changes in plant and equipment, the normal work week, the normal
number of shifts, etc. influence rated capacity.
It is apparent that the investigator who wished to quantify the
rigorous cost concept would face a difficult task.He would have
to use some "normal cost" concept which abstracted from seasonal
and cyclical changes in factor prices, yet which admitted structural
price changes (if he were interested in changes in capacity).He
would also have to distinguish private and social costs if he were
interested in the efficiency of allocation of resources.
Changes in efficiency—in cost per unit of output—as output is
varied along a given cost function do not affect capacity. For ex-
ample changes in average cost due to the operation of the law of
variable proportions are already defined in the cost function, and
the minimum point on the cost function fixes the capacity output.
High or low rates of utilization may involve increased costs per
unit of output, but this is precisely because capacity does not
change.Again, differences in the quality of individual units of
inputs do not affect capacity either because homogeneous units
are assumed, or because some sort of efficiency unit is defined, or
because the cost function is defined to allow for variations in the
quality of inputs.All such influences will also be reflected in
utilization ratios based on the engineering data. Even if engineer-
ing capacity is defined independently of cost, the rate of utilization
is not independent of price-cost relationships.
Changes in efficiency which involve shifts of the cost function
may change capacity.At constant factor prices, such shifts will
result from the introduction of new machinery, new processes, re-
organizations of production, etc.Since capacity has changed, the
behavior of the utilization ratio depends on the shapes and posi-
tions of the cost and revenue functions before and after the innova-
tion.As has already been pointed out, influences of this type will
alter the figures on engineering capacity, which will also reflect
such changes in the organization of production as are induced by
changes in relative factor prices.
Another class of problem is that of estimating peak production
potentials. There are really two questions involved here: Can peak
capacity be estimated, and can full utilization of peak capacity be
attained?Neither of these questions can be answered by the pub-
lished data alone since there will be different answers for different
economic conditions.
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Conceptually peak capacity would be that output at which the
average total cost function became vertical.Whether such a limit
really exists, or whether it is always possible to get a little more
output by the expenditure of a sufficiently lavish amount of re-
sources, are not questions to be considered here. However, raising
the problem suggests several questions that should he addressed to
the published data. For example is capacity defined for a maximum
work week or it be increased by longer hours or by multiple-
shift operations?In cotton-spinning, the number of spindles in
place declined from 36.7 million in 1927 to 23.0 million in 1950,
but the number of spindle-hours run increased from 102.6 billion in
1927 to 116.1 billion in 1950. The increase in hours run per spindle
was primarily the result of the increased use of multiple shifts.
Again, the data for some industries exclude the capacities of long-
idle plants which can and will be reactivated if demand warrants it.
The question of the attainable rate of utilization again leads into
priceconsiderations.Many of the industries in our collection
reached higher rates of utilization during World War II than in
peacetime.'It is entirely possible that these wartime rates of
utilization were simply not attainable under peacetime conditions.
The published data reveal nothing about the age distribution and
general efficiency of the production units included in the capacity
totals. A considerable fraction of the rated capacity in a particular
industry may be so marginal that it can be profitably employed only
under wartime or other abnormal conditions of demand.
Seasonal fluctuations in production also have an important bear-
ing on the attainable annual rate of utilization. War conditions may
have virtually eliminated seasonal fluctuations in production stem-
ming from the demand side. This factor could go a long way toward
explaining the high annual rates of utilization of the war years.
The problem of seasonal fluctuation appears in extreme form in the
electric power industry.The utilization ratio on an annual basis
never rose above 39 per cent in the 1920's or 1930's, and the
maximum ratio attained in the 1940's was 59 per cent (1948). One
of the principal reasons for these low ratios is that power com-
panies must be prepared to meet peak loads on demand, and there
is extremely wide intra-annual variation in the demand for electric
power.
These comments serve to emphasize the caution with which in-
ferences should be drawn from utilization ratios based on the engi-
'See Table 10.
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neering data. In particular, statements that peak rates of utilization
are low and that excess capacity exists should be made with care.
One final point: if an attempt were made to estimate the peak
production potential for a substantial segment of the economy from
capacity data for individual industries, it would be necessary to
take into account the relations among the various industries and
the general availability of resources since the capacity estimates
for each industry assume the ready availability of all resources
other than productive facilities.
Secular andCyclicalVariations in Capacity
%Vhen the capacity series are plotted, capacity appears to in-
crease almost continuously in growing industries and to decrease
almost continuously in declining industries—the direction of Ca-
pacity change seems to be largely independent of cyclical fluctu-
ations in output.This visual impression is confirmed when the
data are studied in more systematic fashion.
The number of years during which capacity changed in the same
or opposite direction as production, during expansions and con-
tractions of production, is shown in Table 1, with the industries
grouped by type of secular change. Capacity decreased infrequently
during expansions of production and increased frequently during
contractions of production in industries experiencing secular growth
of capacity. The opposite was the case in industries experiencing
secular decline.2 The same generalizations hold when comparisons
aremadewith a one-year lag of capacity change behind production
change.
Atfirst sight, capacity in the remaining industries appeared to
display somewhat greater cyclical sensitivity. However, inspection
of the plotted data disclosed that these industries had experienced
mixed secular change.when periods of growth and decline were
marked off by visual inspection and separate comparisons made for
the subperiods, it was found that changes in capacity in these in-
dustries were also influenced by secular growth or decline.
At first thought these results are somewhat surprising to anyone
accustomed to thinking of capital formation as the major cause of
capacity change and as displaying wide cyclical variation.How-
ever, reflection indicates that the findings are not really startling.
First it is also usual to think of capital formation in individual in-
2lncidentally, about one-half of the cases of capacity growth during ex-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dustries as dominated by secular growth, as in the application of
the acceleration principle to the long-run growth of an industry.
Wide fluctuations in aggregate capital formation over the business
cycle are not at all inconsMtent with investment in some industries
and disinvestment in others.Secondly it may take considerable
time to put new facilities into place, and it is reasonable to expect
that projects initiated during upswings will often carry over for a
year or two into contractions. Even if growing industries initiated
no new expansion programs during cyclical contractions of output,
a net increase in capacity could occur because of this lag. On the
other hand, capacity growth is also common during the initial years
of upswings because some new projects are initiated during the
preceding contractions. Finally disinvestment of physical capacity
is a time-consuming process.If cyclical declines in demand lead
some firms to failure, that in itself takes time; even then the facili-
ties may pass into the hands of new owners, particularly if the con-
traction proves to be brief.Disinvestment which results from the
failure of continuing firms to replace deteriorated facilities is also
likely to he drawn out.It is probable that unless contractions are
prolonged and severe, neither the time nor the desire to disinvest
will be present in growing industries.
It is interesting that in a majority of the growing industries ca-
pacity decreased more often during years of expansion than during
years of contraction. However, most of these cases occurred during
the long and feeble expansion of 1933—1937, which followed three
years of sharp contraction (Table 2).Generally low rates of ca-
pacity utilization prevailed throughout this eight-year period.It is
apparent that the burden of excess capacity during a major depres-
sion inhibits capacity growth even in industries undergoing secular
expansion.
To sum up: capacity change, and by inference fixed investment,
in particular industries is dominated by secular growth. In the case
of growing industries, the secular expansion of output makes for
relative immunity to cyclical contractions—note the small number
of years of contraction experienced by growing industries (Table 1).
Furthermore in growing industries contractions of production do not
usually prevent the expansion of capacity projects initiated
during upswings carry over a year or two into contractions, and be-
cause favorable longrun expectations encourage investment even
during periods of depressed demand. In the absence of long periods
of cyclically depressed demand, capacity expansion may be ex-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































_CAPACITY AND THE ACCELERATION PRINCIPLE
TABLE 3
Average Amplitudes of Production and Capacity during
Cyclical Expansions and Contractions, 1907—1950




induseri Covered tion tion itj' tion uy
A. industries Experiencing Seculat Growth of Capacity
By-product coke 1913—1948Growth 170 54 —100 18
Steel ingots 1917—1949Growth 260 42 —193 15
Petroleum refining 1917—1948Growth 135 111 —24 12
Electric power 1921—1945Growth 696 954 —79 109
Paper 1920—1949Growth 547 346 —175 32
high explosives 1926—1949Growth 133 55 —59 12
B. industries Experiencing Secular Decline of Capacity
Beehive coke 1910—1948Decline 497 —199 --777 —308
Wheat flour 1924—1950Decline 146 —2 —110
Cotton spinning 1923—1949Decline 231 —35 —195 —25
Black blasting powder1923—1949Decline 57 —143 —242 —260
C. Industries Experiencing Mixed Secular Change of Capacity
Portlandcement 1913—1944Mixed 407 140 —351 31
1913—1932Growth 378 335 —355 64
1933—1944Decline 437 —56 —346 —13
Electrolyticcopper 1907—1947Mixed 498 140 —434 4
1907—1932Growth 412 255 —427 9
1937—1947Decline 515 —22 —449 -6
Pig iron 1914—1949Mixed 172 24 —140 0
1914—1924Growth 128 14 —105 7
1925—1938Decline 157 1 —203 —9
1939—1949Growth 282 79 —116 1
aThe units for each industry are as follows:
By-product coke 00,000 tons Wheat flour 00,000 barrels
Steel ingots 00,000 tons Cotton spinning 00,000,000 spindle-
Petroleum refining 0,000 barrel's hours
Electric power00,000,000 kilowatt-Black blasting powder 00,000 pounds
hours Portland cement 00,000 barrels
Paper 0,000 tons Electrolytic copper 000 tons
111gb explosives 000,000 poundsPig iron 00,000 tons
Beehive coke 0,000 tons
bExcluding an extreme value associated with a change in the length of the work-
ing week after 1948 (see Appendix A). The average including the extreme value is
—87.
Note: The amplitudes of the various industries arenot comparable, but theampli-
tudes of production and capacity in the same industry are.The amplitude of each
expansion is the algebraic change from the troughto the peak year; the amplitude of
eachcontraction is the algebraic change from peak to trough.The average ampli-
tudes are arithmetic means of the individual amplitudes.The dates of the peaks
and troughs of production are those of the individual cycles in each series. Every
reversal of production was treated as initiating a cyclical phase. The amplitudes
of the corresponding phases in capacity are based on peaks and troughs which lag
thosein production. A lag of one year was used for most industries, but a two-year
lag was employed for petroleum refining, electric power, and portland cement, and
nolag was used for paper and black blasting powder.
Notes continued on next page
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Notes to Table 3 (continued)
Only complete expansions and contractions are included; hence the periods coy-
ered are shorter than in Table 1. One expansion has been omitted in the subperiod
averages for electrolytic copper since it overlapped the division between periods of
growth and decline.The expansion in pig iron which began in 1939 has been in-
cluded in the subperiod average for the growth period 1940—1951.
hand, disinvestment will be relatively continuous in industries ex-
periencing secular decline—cyclical expansions of production will
often fail to press heavily on available capacity or engender opti-
mistic long-run expectations.
Cyclical Amplitudes of Capacity andProduction
The average amplitudes of production aad capacity during cycli-
cal expansions and contractions are presented in Table 3.Where
appropriate, the cycles are lagged behind those in production, as
explained in note a of the table.Secular change again dominates
the results.For example the average amplitudes of capacity are
positiveduring contractionsinindustries experiencing secular
growth and negative during expansions in the declining industries.
Again, the cyclical amplitudes of capacity are smaller than those
of production in all but two of the industries—a not unexpected re-
sult given the facts that capacity is relatively insensitive to cycli-
cal changes in production and that production is increased or de-
creased by varying, the rate of utilization as well as capacity.3
Would not the rate of change of capacity be modified by cyclical
changes in production even if the direction of change were not?
Granted that the investment horizon in a growing industry is rela-
tively long, one would still expect that cyclical contractions of de-
mand and production would slow the growth of capacity.Similarly
it plausible that, in declining industries, the rate of dis-
investment would tend to decrease during cyclical expansions of
demand and production.The measures in Table 4 confirm these
hypotheses. The average annual rates of increase of capacity were
larger during expansions than contractions in the six growing in-
dustries and the average annual rates of decrease of capacity were
larger during contractions than expansions in three of the four de-
clining industries.4 When the fact that the rate of increase of ca-
pacity in the growing industries tended to be greater during ex-
3The two exceptions—electric power and black blasting powder—re-
spectively were experiencing such high rates of growth and decline (Table
9) that the secular changes in capacity were greater than the cyclical
changes in output.
4The same tendencies hold for the periods of growth and decline in two
of the three cases of mixed secular change.
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TABLE 4
Average Annual Rates of Change of Production and Capacity
during Cyclical Expansions and Contractions, 1907—1950







Industry Covered tion tion ity cion icy
A. Industries Experiencing Secular Growth of Capacity
By-product coke 1913—1948Growth 59 19 —66 16
Steel ingots 1917—1949Growth 91 15 —132 11
Petroleum refining 1917—1948Growth 22 17 14 14
Electric power 1921—1945Growth 113 141 —50 84
Paper 1920—1949Growth 120 67 —126 28
High explosives 1926—1949Growth 47 14 —36 1].
B. Industries Experiencing Secular Decline of Capacity
Beehive coke 1910—1948Decline 249 —159 —561—169
Wheat flour 1924—1950Decline 41 —10 "43 _1213
Cotton spinning 1923—1949Decline 103 —16 —134 —15
Black blasting powder1923—1949Decline 36 —74 —98—151
C. Industries Experiencing Mixed Secular Change of Capacity
Portland cement 1913—1944Mixed 137 13 —152 22
1913—1932Growth 97 49 —122 49
1933—1944Decline 178 —22 —493 —14
Electrolytic copper 1907—1947Mixed 179 38 —164 3
1907—1932Growth 114 70 —137 12
1937—1947Decline 316 7 —220 —15
Pig iron 1914—1949Mixed 64 9 —103 2
1914—1924Growth 72 10 —105 7
1925—1938Decline 47 1 —119
1939—1949Growth 73 21 —75 3
aSeenote a of Table 3 for units for each industry.
bExcluding an extreme value associated with a change in the Length of the work-
ing week alter 1948 (see Appendix A).The average including the extreme value
is—33.
Note: The measures for different industries are not comparable, but the measures
for production and capacity in each industry are.The total amplitudes of the in-
dividualexpansions and contractions in production and capacity are calculated for
each series as explained in the Note to Table 3.The total amplitudes were then
divided by the number of years in each expansion or contraction.The resulting
average annual rates of change were then averaged for all expansions and contrac-
tionsin each series.Only complete expansions and contractions are included;
hence the periods covered are generally shorter than in Table 1.One expansion
has been omitted in the subperiod averages for electrolytic copper since it over-
lapped the division between periods of growth and decline.The expansion in pig
iron which began in 1939 has been included in the subperiod average for the growth
period 1940—1951.
pansions is coupled with the fact that those industries experienced
many more years of expansion than contraction, it is easy to under-
stand why the total amplitudes were so much larger during expan-
sions than contractions (Table 3).
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Cyclical Variations in Capacity Utilization
If capacity remained constant, the rate of utilization would vary
directly with output.'When both capacity and output change, the
change in utilization depends on the relative changes in capacity
and output.Since the cyclical amplitudes of capacity are typically
smaller than those of production, and since capacity tends to mive
TABLE 5
Number of Years in Which Production and Capacity Changed in the
Same (+) or OppositeDirectionas the Rate of
Utilization of Capacity during Expansions













Industry Covered tion+ —+ —+—+ —
A. Industries Experiencing Secular Growth of Capacity
By-product coke 1910—1949 Growth216161012 029
Steel ingots 1914—1951 Growth232187120210
Petroleum refining 1917—1949 Growth17916106 033
Electricpower 1921—1951 Growth1951775 00 5
Paper 1917—1950 Growth16915980 26
High explosives 1922—1951 Growth16411 99 0 2 7
B.Industries Experiencing Secular Decline of Capacity
Beehive coke 1908—1949 Decline210614182154
Wheat flour 1923—1951Decline1606108365
Cotton spinning 1922—1950Decline15031212194
Black blasting powder 1922—1951Decline10349124106
C. Industries Experiencing Mixed Secular Change of Capacity
Portland cement 1909—1949 Mixed 2071314103310
1909—1932 Growth8 877108
1933—1949 Decline120573232
Electrolytic copper 1906—1949Mixed 1961113 18 0 510
1906—1934 Growth12610 7100 46
1935—1949Decline70 1680 14
Pig iron 1913—1951 Mixed 214141113049
1913—1924Growth 51 5 1 500 5
1925—1939Decline100375023
1940—1951Growth636 3302 1
Note: In some industries there were years in which no change of capacity
or utilization occurred and consequently in which the number of observa-
tions is less than the number of years covered.Capacity utilization is
measured by the ratio of production to capacity.
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inversely to output during contractions in growing industries and
during expansions in declining industries, utilization tends to vary
directly with output (Table 5).The number of opposing movements
of production and utilization is a small minority in every industry.
Almost universally the opposing movements occur on the upswings
in growing industries and on the downsw.ings in declining indus-
fries. Thus when utilization moves in opposition to production in a
growing industry, it is because capacity has increased more rapidly
than production during a year of expansion.
The opposing movements of capacity and utilization are more
numerous.Consider the growing industries.In addition to those
years when capacity increased more than production during up-
swings, causing utilization to fall, there are the years in which
capacity decreased as production, and therefore utilization, de-
creased. Again, on numerous occasions capacity continued to grow
as output and utilization declined during downswings.Similar re-
marks apply in the case of the declining industries.Considerably
more often than not, capacity decreased as utilization rose along
with production during upswings.Occasionally capacity and utili-
zation moved inversely during downswings either because capacity
fell more than output or because it increased.
Thus although utilization generally rises and falls in conformity
with cycles in production, the same is not true of capacity.Since
capacity tends to increase continuously in growing industries and
to decrease continuously in declining industries, the direction of
capacity change is largely independent of the direction of change
in utilization.
Capacity Utilization andtheAcceleration Principle
We may distinguish two versions of the acceleration principle as
applied to cyclical fluctuations in production. In the strong version
a fixed ratio of capital stock to output is assumed to hold continu-
ously and net investment varies directly and proportionally with the
rate of change of output. The existence of excess capacity is de-
nied by assumption, and investment and disinvestment are treated
symmetrically.This version of the acceleration hypothesis is
clearly contradicted by our previous findings. Disinvestment rarely
occurs during contractions in growing industries—the accelerator
does not operate in the downward direction.On the other hand
disinvestment occurs as often or more often than investment during
expansions in declining industries—cyclical increases in produc-
tion do not press heavily on capacity or create optimistic long-run
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expectations, andtheaccelerator does not operate in the upward
direction.
In the modified version of the acceleration principle the assump-
tion that a fixed ratio of capital stock to output holds at all times
is relaxed. Thus the possibility of excess capacity is admitted to
the analysis. For example the operation of the accelerator is sus-
pended during the early portion of the upswing until unutilized Ca-
pacity has been brought into operation.Furthermore since excess
capacity is assumed in an initial stage of the upswing, it must have
been present during the preceding contraction.Therefore any de-
cline in capacity which takes place during the downswing cannot
be proportional to the decline in output.Disinvestment can occur
only through a failure to replace deteriorated facilities.The rate
of replacement can drop to zero but no lower. Once this stage has
been reached, disinvestment is a function of the rate of depreci-
ation of the capital stock rather than of the current rate of change
of production, and therefore excess capacity can develop during the
downswing.5Thus in the modified version, the operation of the
accelerator is largely confined to the latter portion of the upswing,
although disinvestment may be proportional to the rate of decline
in output during the initial stages of contraction while replacement
is less than depreciation but still positive.However, the finding
that investment is ordinarily positive during contractions in growing
industries contradicts this part of the hypothesis, at least as ap-
plied to brief contractions.It is also apparent that the modified
principle is not applicable to declining industries since surplus
capacity is ubiquitous there.
The utilization ratios of the various industries at the peaks and
troughs of business cycles are listed in Table 6.The average
level' oi the utilization ratios is of no importance in the present
context—what is relevant is the spread between utilization ratios
at peaks and troughs and the range of the utilization ratios attained
at the various peaks.
The utilization ratios at the troughs are usually considerably
lower than those at the peaks—a fact which stands out most clearly
when adjacent peaks and troughs are compared. This fact is recog-
nized in the modified version of the acceleration principle by sus-
5For a discussion of this point and of the modified acceleration prin-
ciple in general, see J. R. Hicks, A Contribution to the Theory of the
Trade Cycle,London,Oxford University Press, 1950.
'The average level depends primarily on the particular characteristics
of each industry that govern the spread between rated capacity, which

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































,CAPACITY AND THE ACCELERATION PRINCIPLE
pending the operation of the accelerator in the early portion of the
upswing until unutilized capacity has been brought into operation.
However, since capacity increases more often than not during con-
fractions and the early stages of expansions in growing industries,
contractions are ordinarily brief in these industries, and temporarily
"low" rates of utilization are not apt to have a severe depressing
influence on longer-term expectations.Furthermore some projects
originated during upswings may carry over into downswings.On
the other hand the pressure of unutilized capacity is certainly felt
during deep and prolonged depressions (Table 2).
The rates of utilization attained at the peaks of many of the
peacetime cycles were well below the record wartime rates.Obvi-
ously greater rates of output could have been attained in those
years by more intensive use of existing capacity.It may be ob-
jectedthat the earlier discussion stressed the relevance of cost-
price relationships to the question of attainable rates of capacity
utilization and that it is therefore incorrect to infer that surplus
capacity existed at many of the peacetime peaks.However, that
objection has little force since the acceleration principle posits a
technological restraint on capacity utilization.Of course if the
assumption of a rigid ratio of capital stock to output is not taken
literally, it is quite possible that after some critical limit an in-
creased rate of output will accelerate the growth of capacity even
if a higher level of utilization is possible.
To test the latter hypothesis, scatter diagrams relating capacity
change to the level of utilization were prepared, and it was found
that higher levels of utilization tended to be associated with
greater changes of capacity in growing industries (including in-
dustries experiencing mixed secular change).This tendency is
illustratedin Table 7, which shows the average change of ca-
pacity (appropriately lagged) associated with low, medium, and
high ranges of capacity utilization.7In every industry there was a
substantial increase in the average rate of growth of capacity be-
tween the low and medium ranges of utilization and again between
the medium and high ranges of utilization.
The low range of utilization includes most of the few years of
disinvestment experienced by growing industries, which of course
'The lag for each industry was determined by inspection of scatter
diagrams.Zero, one, and two-year lags were tried for each industry and
the lag which yielded the least dispersion of the observations was chosen
(see Appendix B for the ranges of utilization and the number of observa-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.CAPACITY AND THE ACCELERATION PRINCIPLE
considerably reduces the average rate of capacity change.How-
ever, capacity growth at a rate comparable to that typical of the
medium range of utilization seldom occurs in the low range.The
lower boundary oi the medium range of utilization may be regarded
as a level of utilization above which substantial capacity expan-
sion is usually induced. This interpretation gains support from the
fact that the high range of utilization in the by-product coke, steel,
petroleum-refining, electric power, and paper industries includes
primarily years of extraordinary demand associated with war and
its aftermath.e The medium range of utilization is the more typical
of normal peacetime conditions, and the increase in the average
rate of capacity growth between the iow and medium ranges may
therefore be regarded as a significant acceleration of the rate of
growth, representing the effect of cyclically induced investment.
These results show conclusively that there is a relationship be-
tween the level of utilization and the rate of growth of capacity—a
relationship which is broadly consistent with the predictions of the
modified acceleration principle.However, the evidence should be
interpreted with caution. In the first place inspection of the scatter
diagrams reveals a fairly regular tendency for the rate of capacity
change to rise as utilization rises within the medium range of
utilization.It is not as if output increased until it hit a definite
limit of utilization which imposed a technical restraint on output
unless capacity were expanded.Moderate levels of utilization in-
duce moderate expansions of capacity despite the fact that a sub-
stantial margin of unused capacity still exists.Secondly there is
considerable variability around the underlying relationship between
utilization and capacity change, as the average deviations in Table
7 indicate.
These observations suggest that there is a fairly wide range of
entrepreneurial choice involved in reactions to increased levels of
output and utilization.Indeed that is also suggested by the theory
of investment.The supply prices of assets, the availability and
interest cost of funds, and the prospective yield of the investment
S
years 1942—1946 are not included in the averages. However, very
few observations from the 1920's or 1930's are included in the high range
of utilization of the industries listed above.The years typical of that
range are 1916—1919, 1940—1941, and 1947—1951. The high range in Port-
land cement is almost completely dominated by the 1920's, a decade of
intense construction activity.The high range in electrolytic copper in-
cludes most of the years of rapid growth during 1910—1918, and again
most of the yeais 1925—1930.The early 1920's were years of low utili-
zation and disinvestment as the industry absorbed the excess capacity
created during World War I.
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over its economic life must all be considered in investment de-
cisions.Current and recent levels of capacity utilization pre-
sumably enter these calculations in two main ways: they provide
part of the basis on which future levels of demand and output are
estimated and they influence the relative costs of production with
given and expanded facilities.If these influences are strong
enough to produce the investment behavior predicted by the ac-
celeration principle, the neglect of expectations and cost-price
relationships in the application of the principle to cyclical phe-
nomena is justified, otherwise it is not.
But what is the investment behavior predicted by the acceleration
principle? The principle does not derive its force from the propo-
sition that induced investment occurs during upswings but rather
from the proposition that net real investment varies directly with
the rate of growth of output.Thus far we have shown only that
there is a relationship between the level of capacity utilization and
the rate of change of capacity, but this finding is consistent with
the hypothesis that induced investment is a function of the level of
output. We turn now to consideration of the hypothesis that changes
in the rate of growth of output induce changes in the rate of growth
of capacity.
If changes in capacity always required changes in capital stock
in a fixed proportion and if the level of utilization of capacity were
constant, both changes in capacity and changes in capital stock
would be proportional to changes in output, i.e. net real investment
would vary directly and proportionally with the rate of change of
output.It is clear from the data that the second condition does not
hold and it is to be doubted on a priori grounds that the first con-
dition holds.However, the acceleration hypothesis would still be
a powerful tool if only the direction of change of net investment
could be explained by it, and that could be true even if the fore-
going conditions do not hold rigorously.9
Since the present data yield no information about the ratio of
capital stock to output, they cannot be used to test for a direct re-
lationship between net investment and the rate of change of output.
Nonetheless the data can be used to establish whether changes in
the rate of growth of output are associated with changes in the rate
9lndeed, in view of the rather long period that may be required to put
new facilities in place, some change in capacity utilization must occur
if a present increase in output is to induce a future expansion of capacity.
That is, this must be trueif the acceleration coefficient is applied to
changes in output rather than to changes in the demand for output.
439CAPACITY AND THE ACCELERATION PRINCIPLE
of growth of capacity in the same direction, and therefore whether
the possibility exists that net real investment has changed in the
predicted direction.In Table 8 we compare the directions in which
the rates of growth of production and capacity changed during cy-
clical expansions in growing industries.Comparisons are made
with three different lags and both including and excluding years in
which capacityutilization wasinthelow raligedefinedin
Appendix B.
The comparisons yield mixed results.According to the acceler-
ation principle, a decrease in the rate of increase of production
should induce a decrease in the rate of increase of capacity, and
vice-versa, so that the rates of change should consistently vary in
the same direction.No such persistent relationship is discernible
in the data, whether simultaneous rates of change are compared or
lags are assumed.In either case there are numerous opposing
movements. On the other hand in many industries the conforming
movements outnumber the opposing movements by a considerable
margin in the most "favorable" of the three sets of comparisons
(zero, one-year, or two-year lag) so that some tendency toward the
predicted behavior seems to be present.
Here we encounter a difficulty.In growing industries capacity
increases almost continuously, but the magnitude of increase can
and often does vary erratically from one year to the next.The
same is true of the rate of change of production during cyclical ex-
pansions.Hence it is quite conceivable that at least one out of
thethree sets of comparisons would yield favorable results by
chance.However, it will be recalled that in each industry one of
the lags yielded superior results when the relationship between the
level of utilization and the rate of capacity change was studied.
Our confidence in the present comparisons would be increased if
the same lag were again found to yield good results.That does
occur in the by-product coke, paper,1° high explosives, and electro-
lytic copper industries.The preponderance of conforming move-
ments in the simultaneous comparisons for the petroleum-refining
and electric power industries is probably due to chance since the
true lags seem to be on the order of two years in those industries.
A two-year lag yields the best results for steel ingots whereas a
one-year lag was superior in the earlier test.The reverse is true
'°The prepopderance of conforming movements is even greater with a
two-year lag in the paper industry, but the true lag appears to be quite



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































jCAPACITY AND THE ACCELERATION PRINCIPLE
in the case of Portland cement.Of course the true lag may be of
intermediate length in those two industries.Finally none of the
lags yields particularly favorable results for pig iron.
Perhaps these mixed results are all that may reasonably be ex-
Ceteris a firm in a growing industry contemplating
an expansion of capacity is likely to undertake a greater expansion
if output has been increasing rapidly than if it has been increasing
slowly.The rate of increase of demand and output in the recent
past is part of the data on which an estimate of the rate of increase
of demand and output in the future, and therefore the needed in-
crease in capacity, will be based.It follows that there should be a
tendency for an increase in the rate of increase of production to
lead to an increase in the rate of increase of capacity and vice-
versa.It also follows that there should be numerous exceptions to
this pattern of behavior since capacity can he used more or less in-
tensively and expectations are not rigidly linked to recent events.
Capacity and Capacity Utilization in War and Peace
Itis difficult to generalize about the influence of war on ca-
pacity.Some industries will be stimulated and others retarded by
war.Furthermore the rate of change of capacity during a war will
be affected by the levels of capacity and capacity utilization which
prevail at the beginning of the war, which, in turn, are related to
the peacetime developments which precede the war.Again, the
rates oi change of capacity in a given industry during two widely
separated wars will be affected by the stage of secular growth
reached prior to each war, the composition of the national output
during the wars, the degree of restraint on private action during the
wars, etc.Given this diversity of influences, perhaps the major
value of Table 9 is the light which it throws on the historical
fortunes of particular industries.
Nonetheless it is possible to discern certain tendencies which
the industries share in common.In six of the eight industries for
which data are available for both world wars, the percentage rates
of increase of capacity were greater in World War I than in World
War II.However, in the case of two of the industries included in
this group, the higher percentage rate of growth during World War I
reflects the low base from which capacity increased—the absolute
rate of growth of capacity was greater in World War II than in World
War I in those industries.World War II accelerated the growth of
capacity in ten of the thirteen industries, after the slow growth of
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ABSOLUTE CHANGES OF CAPACITya
A. Industries Experiencing Secular Growth of Capacity
By-product
coke 1910—1949 17 20 39 24 2 13 10
Steel ingots 1914—1951 16.5 32.6 10.5 9.514.129.7
Petroleum
refining 1917—1949 15.8 20.7 5,916.433.9
Electric power 1921—1951172.6 172.0C82.0150.6 385.7
Paper 1899_950d42.524.424.6 60.3 28.555.2 101.5
High
explosives1922—1951 12.6 3.830.69.1
B. Industries Experiencing Secular Decline of Capacity
Beehive coke1908—1949 —119—13—140—282 —147 14 27
Wheat flour 1923—1951—20.2 —1.1'—20.9 1.7 —72.0
Cotton
spinning 1922—1950—12.6 -_3•9g —24.7—8.6 —4.6
Black blasting
powder 1922—1951—89.4 —86.1 —112.7 —58.2
C. Industries Experiencing Mixed Secular Change of Capacity
Portland
cement 1909—1949 38.461.419.4109.0 3.6 —20.649.9
Electrolytic
copper 1906—1949 24 41 102 13 8 —2 —1
Pig iron 1913—1951 6.3 12.0 1.9—1.615.013.2
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF CAPACITY'
A. Industries Experiencing Secular Growth of Capacity
By-product
coke 1910—1949 19.523.323.6 6.5 0.4 2.11.4
Steel ingots 1914—1951 3.6 7.2 1.7 1.3 1.72.0
Petroleum
refining 1917—1949 13.3 14.6 1.7 4.06.5
Electric power 1921—1951 15.0 1S.OC 3.2 4.58.8
Paper 1899_l9SOe 15.3 8.8 3.8 7.9 2.1 3.35.0
High
explosives1922—1951 2.7 2.Oe 0.7 5.41.2
B. Industries Experiencing Secular Decline of Capacity
Beehive coke1908—1947 —2.1—0.2—2.5 —5.7 —7.0 2.23.6
Wheat flour 1923—1951 —1.0 —1.00.1 —4.0
Cotton
spinning 1922—1950 —1.3 —2.6—1.2 —0.7
Black blasting
powder 1922—1951 —2.8 ....3•0h—3.5—7.]. —72
C.IndustriesExperiencing MixedSecularChange of Capacity
Portland
cement 1909—1949 3.76.0 1.4 7.6 0.1—0.82.1
Electrolytic
copper 1906—1949 4.3 7.411.5 0.9 0.6—0.2 —0.1
Pig iron 1913—1951 1.2 2.4 0.3 —0.3 2.72.3
Notes on next pageCAPACITY AND THE ACCELERATION PRINCIPLE
Notes to Table 9
aTotal change of capacity between the initial and final years of each period,
divided by the number of years in the interval.See note a of Table 3 for units for
each industry.
c1921_1929.
dEstimatesof paper capacity are available at five—year intervals, 1899—1914.




•Total percentage change of capacity between the initial and final years of each
period, divided by the number of years in the interval.
the depression decade."In contrast, capacity grew more slowly
during World War I than in the preceding peacetime interval in three
of the five industries for which data are available, although it
would not do torest much weight on thislimited number of
observations.
As faraspeacetime changes of capacityareconcerned, the rates
of growth of capacity during the prosperous 1920's were almost
universally greater than in the depression decade that followed. A
great majority of the industries experienced a greater rate of growth
in the interval after World War H than in the depression decade, and
several others grew more rapidly after 1946 in either the
1920's or 1030's. Of course these high rates of postwar growth are
for intervals of only three to five years whereas the earlier averages
cover periods of ten years.
During World War II ten of the thirteen industries attained higher
levels of capacity utilization than in any previous peacetime year
(Table 10).It is evident that, under the pressure of war demand,
capacityutilization can be extended substantially beyond the
normal peacetime levels, although perhaps at considerable cost as
marginal capacity is tapped.'2Capacity was not utilized as in-
tensively during World War .1.Sevenof the eight industries for
which data are available operated at higher peak rates of utiliza-
tion in World War II than in World War I and four of them exceeded
the World War I rate of utilization during the 1920's.The peak war
rates did not all come at the same time in either war, but many
came early in both wars.
"This comparison and those which follow count a slower rate of de-
dine as an acceleration of the rate of growth.
'21t is interesting to note in this connection that several of the indus-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































List of Capacity Series and Their Principle Characteristics
1. Beehive coke, 1908—1949
Source: 1908—1930, E. G. Nourse and associates, America's
Capacity To Produce, Brookings Institution, 1934; 1931—1949,
Minerals Yearbook, Bureau of Mines, 1949.
Unit: Tons. The basic data are number of ovens. The number
of ovens is multiplied by 590 tons to derive the capacity esti-
mate."This (590 tons) is a fair measure of the annual ca-
pacity of the standard beehive coke oven" (Nourse, op. cit.,
p. 65). A later (confidential) source states that the average
oven size may have declined since 1929.However, an esti-
mate of capacity in 1940 made by other means corresponds
closely to the figure derived from the assumption of an aver-
age oven capacity of 590 tons.
Principal Characteristics: Includes idle ovens."In 1929 the
capacity of idle plants was 9.3 million tons, or 44 percent of
the aggregate capacity operating and idle" (Nourse, op. cit.,
p. 65). Nourse gives an estimate of 5 per cent as the discount
for repairs and plant disability.Mean annual beehive coke
capacity has declined from a peak of 59 million tons in 1910
to 8.2 million tons in 1949, as the beehive oven has been dis-
placed by the more efficient by-product oven."The present-
day importance of this type of equipment lies chiefly in its
ability to provide a quick and inexpensive means of producing
coke to meet peak demands" (Minerals Yearbook, 1949, p.
415).
2. By-product coke, 1910—1949
Source:1910-1930, Nourse, op.cit.;1931—1949, Minerals
Yearbook, 1949.
Unit: Tons
Principal Characteristics: "The basis for calculating the po-
tential annual coke capacity of a plant is the minimum coking
time necessary to produce a coke with the qualities suitable
for its intended use.For this reason, the potential capacity
of a plant is subject to change from year to year, depending
on the age and condition of ovens, character and quality of
coal charged, type of coke required, and other related eco-
nomic conditions. ...Itis believed, however, that the po-
tential capacity. .. isa good measure of the practical oper-
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ating capacity" (Minerals Yearbook, 1949, p. 417). The manu-
facture of by-product coke is a continuous process.Nourse
estimates a 5 per cent discount for "scurfing of ovens, re-
pairs, and plant disability" (Nourse, op. cit., p. 553).Mean
annual by-product coke capacity (including idle plants) has
increased from 8.6 million tons in 1910 to 74.1 million tons
in 1949.
3. Pig iron, 1913—1951
Source: Annual Statistical Report, American Iron and Steel
Institute.
Units: Tons
Principal Characteristics: Rated capacity of blast furnaces.
Does not include blast furnaces which have long been idle.
Continuous operation. "...itwill be seen that the concept of
capacity in blast furnaces is a rather elastic one. During the
war [World War II, for example, it was possible, by drawing
on plants which under other circumstances would have been
regarded as obsolete and by operating for unusual stretches
oftime without relining or other repairs, to run for some
months at well above normal practical capacity" (Nourse, op.
cit., p. 256).
4. Steel ingots, 1914—1951
Source: Annual Statistical Report, American Iron and Steel
Institute.
Unit: Tons
Principal Characteristics: Rated capacities of various types
of equipment: open hearth, Bessemer, crucible, electric. Does
not include long idle plants. Continuous operation.
5. Electrolytic copper, 1906—1949
Source: 1906—1929, Nourse, op. cit., p. 557; 1931—1945, Year-
book of the American Bureau of Metal Statistics, various
issues; 1946—1950, Metal Statistics, American Metal Market,
1951.
Unit: Tons
Principal Characteristics: Reported annual capacity of plants
in operation. Nourse places deduction for unavoidable break-
downs at 3 per cent (Nourse, op. cit.).
6. Petroleum refining, 1917—1949
Source:1917—1930, Nourse, op.cit.,p.556; 1931—1949,
Minerals Yearbook, various issues.
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Unit: Barrels of crude run to stills. The rated daily capacity
is multiplied by 365.
Principal Characteristics: Rated capacity of operating plants.
Nourse estimates a discount of 4 per cent for seasonal vari-
ation and 10 per cent for both seasonal variation and shut-
downsfornecessarycleaningandrepairs.Continuous
operation.
7. Portland cement, 1909—1949
Source:1909—1930, Nourse, op.cit.,p.473; 1931—1949,
Minerals Yearbook, various issues.
Unit: Thousands of barrels
Principal Characteristics: Rated capacity.Includes allow-
ance for breakdowns.Nourse places allowance for seasonal
variation at 17 per cent. Continuous operation.
8. Electric power, 1920—1951
Source: Statistical Bulletin, Edison Electric Institute, 1951,
pp. 16—20.
Unit: Kilowatt-hours.Rated capacity in kilowatts is multi-
plied by 8,760 hours (number of hours in year). A multiplier
of 8,784 hours is used for leap years.
Principal Characteristics: Rated capacity of generators. Con-
tinuous operation. Very large seasonal variation.
9. Paper, 1917—1950
Source: Statistics of the Paper industry, 1951, American Paper
and Pulp Association, p. 53.
Unit: Tons.Capacity measured on a tons-per-day basis is
multiplied by 310 days to estimate annual capacity.Daily
output is calculated for a 24-hour day with an allowance for
normal cleanup.
Principal Characteristics: Continuous operation.Capacity is
defined as the maximum amount of paper that can be produced
by a given set of equipment based on normal expectations of
grade and weight expected to be produced.
10. Wheat flour, 1923—1951
Source: 1923—1944, Wheat Ground and Wheat Milling Products,
Bureau of the Census; 1945—1951, Facts for industry Series,
M-16A.
Unit: Annual capacity figures obtained by averaging
monthly data of daily (24-hour) capacity to obtain average
daily capacity and then multiplying this figure by the number
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of working days in the year (306 during 1923—1948, and 255
from 1949 forward).
Principal Characteristics: Rated capacity.Continuous oper-
ation except that small mills usually operate in the daytime
only.The mills covered in the data produced about 85 per
cent of the flour reported in 1923—1924 and 90 to 95 per cent
of the flour reported thereafter.
11. Cotton spinning, single-shift basis, 1922-1950., double-shift
basis, 1934—1950
Source: Cotton Production and Distribution, Bureau of the
Census, various issues.
Unit: Spindle-hours.No capacity data are published.How-
ever, the number of spindle-hours run is published, as is a
monthly utilization ratio.The capacity figure has been de-
rived by dividing spindle-hours by the utilization ratio.The
data were published on a single-shift basis through 1938 and
a double-shift basis after 1933.The published single-shift
data (1922—1938) have been extended through 1950. The aver-
age ratio of the activity ratios on the single-shift and double-
shift basis, which overlap for the period 1934—1938, was ap-
plied to the published double-shift data after 1938.
Principal Characteristics: Capacity does not define an upper
limit.The number of spindles installed has declined from a
peak of 37.9 million in 1925 to 23.0 million in 1950, but the
extension of multiple-shift operation has led to a more than
proportional increase in hours run per spindle.The highest
number of spindle-hours operated before World War H was
102.6 billion (1927).In 1950 the figure was 116.1 billion.
12. Permissible and other high explosives, 1922—1951
Source: 1922—1943, Technical Paper 665, Bureau of Mines,
1944—1951, by letter from the Bureau of Mines.
Unit: Pounds. The daily output that can be prepared ready for
shipment during one daytime shift of 8 hours is multiplied by
300 days to estimate annual capacity.
Principal Characteristics: Rated capacity of operating plants
reporting to Bureau of Mines.Nourse estimates discount for
seasonal variation as 20 per cent.Does not include military
explosives (Nourse, op. cit.).
13. Black blasting powder, 1922—1951.
Source: Technical Paper 665, as cited.
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Unit: Pounds. The daily output that can be prepared for ship-
ment during one 24-hour day is multiplied by 300 days to esti-
mate annual capacity.
Principal Characteristics:Ratedcapacity of operating plants
reporting to Bureau of Mines. Nourse estimates seasonal dis-
count as 24 per cent (Nourse, op. cit.).
APPENDIX B
Ranges of Capacity Utilizationa and Number of Observations










By-product coke 33—54 7 65—85 18 86e93 9
Steel ingots 19—48 7 58—79 14 80—95 11
Petroleum refining63—69 8 70—79ii 80—91 7
Electric power 26—34 7 35—40 12 50—59 5
Paper 58—74 8 75—84 15 85—99 6
Portland cement 23—56 12 62—68 14 70—86 8
Electrolytic copper22—58 12 66—79 11 80—95 13
Pig iron 17—58 10 60—79 16 81—91 7
aUtilization is measured by the ratio of production to capacity.
COMMENT
FRANCO MODIGLIANI, Carnegie Institute of Technology
Bert G. Hickman has performed an extremely useful task in as-
sembling and analyzing a substantial body of evidence bearing on
the empirical usefulness of the "acceleration hypothesis" in ex-
plain.ing fluctuations in investments.
This hypothesis, which represents one of the cornerstones of
many of the recently developed analytical models of the business
cycle, has been seriously challenged of late and most recently by
Arthur F. Burns in his well-known review of J. R. Hicks' book.'In
this review, which directly criticizes Hicks' work and indirectly a
much larger class of business cycle theorists, Burns has emphati-
'J. R. Hicks, A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle, London,
Oxford University Press, 1950; Arthur F. Burns, "Hicks and the Real
Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, February 1952, pp. 1—24.
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cally questioned, if not explicitly denied, the empirical usefulness
of the acceleration mechanism in business cycle analysis: "...the
accelerator of Hicks's model is supposed to do its work in succes-
sive short periods, and I do not think it can be trusted for this
purpose" (pages 11—12); there isn't "...any substantial statistical
support for the acceleration principle, taken as a general theory of
investment in fixed capital over the business cycle" (page 13);
•. practicallyall of it [investment in plant and equipment] is
'autonomous,' practically none of it is 'induced'" (page 14);. . it
will not do to treat investment as a technical echo of the changes
in past output" (page 18); etc.
In this light, Hickman's contribution in bringing together and
analyzing a substantial body of historical data acquires particular
significance. There may be some doubts as to whether his data are
quite as adequate as he seems to think for a conclusive test of the
acceleration principle.But, as I shall try to point out in this com-
ment, such tests as can be carried out from Hickman's data fully
support the acceleration hypothesis properly understood and formu-
lated and confirm that this hypothesis is a very useful principle in
explaining much of the behavior of investment in fixed capital.
The above conclusion is not inconsistent with the many negative
results reported by Hickman because a major portion of his paper is
devoted to destroying a straw man.I submit that most of the econ-
omists who, in recent years, have regarded the acceleration mecha-
nism as a useful component of business cycle theory have in mind
a model which is only faintly related to the one Hickman seems to
be testing in the first five of his seven tables devoted to such
tests.As I shall try to show, it is only in his Table 7 that he
comes reasonably close to a relevant test.
The first point to bear in mind is that the acceleration principle
is a statement about the behavior of net capital outlays while Hick-
man's data relate to net changes in capacity. Now, the outlays (or
the employment of resources) required to bring about an addition to
capacity will tend to occur over a span of time while the actual
addition to capacity will tend to be concentrated at the end of the
span in question.It is clear, therefore, that in general net invest-
ments and net changes in capacity over an arbitrary interval of
time, such as a year, need not bear a stable relation to each other.
Suppose, for instance, that in a giyen industry there is an average
span of, say, two years between the time the construction of new
capacity gets under way and the time the new capacity is completed
and ready to operate.Then, clearly, investment outlays in any.
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year will partly be devoted to completion of projects started in the
previous year which will add to capacity this year, and partly to
starting new projects which will generate additional capacity oniy
next year.Thus, while current investment may react with a short
lag to an increase in output and may depend on the behavior of out-
put over several previous periods,2 the current increase of capacity
may be related to the behavior of output over a more limited and
substantially lagged period of time.Similarly in the presence of
excess capacity, investment outlays of the type required to main-
tain capacity in efficient operating condition may decline, and yet
there may be no formal retirement of capacity of the type recorded
in Hickman's data.
This does not mean that Hickman's data are useless in testing
the acceleration hypothesis; quite the contrary, his series are in
many respects more tractable than investment data in testing the
functioning of this mechanism.It does mean, however,, that the
model to be tested has to be adjusted so that it will apply to ca-
pacity data—and to individual industries rather than to the economy
as a whole.
Such a model can be readily constructed starting from the type of
formulation underlying, say, I-licks' construction—and would run
something like this.3
Assumptions:
1. For a given industry, and for every rate of output, there exists,
at any point of time t, an optimum or desirable level of capacity
which, as a first approximation, may be regarded as proportional to
output. Denoting by K this optimum level of capacity and by 0 the
rate of output, this hypothesis can be stated as4
(1)
The proportionality factor a is characterized by a time subscript
since in principleit may vary over time depending on a host of
factors, some of which will be mentioned later.
2. For a given industry there exists a typical and reasonably
stable span elapsing between the time decisions to increase Ca-
2See Hicks, op. cit., Appendix to Chapter V.
3See e.g. Hollis 13. Chenery, "Overcapacity and the Acceleration Prin-
ciple" Econo,netrica, January 1952, pp. 1—28; R. S. Eckaus, "The Ac-
celeration Principle Reconsidered," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May
1953, pp. 209—230.
4Following Hickman, we shall measure capacity, K, of a given industry
as the flow of output per unit of time obtainable from the existing facili-
ties. Hence K has dimension (output) / (time), while a is a pure number.
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pacity arereachedand the time the additional capacity is actually
installed and ready to operate. We shall denote this lag by g.
3. Whenever there is a prospective "shortage" of capacity in the
sense that the capacity on hand (or already under construction) is
below the level that is optimal to produce the output expected to be
demanded g periods later, expansion of capacity will get underway;
and the rateofexpansion will be roughly proportional to the size of
the Fospective shortage.
Denote by 0(t)therate of output that, at time tg, is expected tg
toprevail at time t.If we are dealing with annual data on capacity,
K, and output (as Hickman does), then the three stated hypotheses
lead to an equation of the form
(2) = — —
provided
(2a) >
Here the constant(with dimension 1/time) measures, primarily,
the speed with which a given industry endeavors to make up de-
ficiencies in capacity.For instance, if the unit of time were a
year, a value of 0.5 f9rwould mean that the industry tends to
make up such deficiencies at the rate of 50 per cent per year.
Clearly the numerical value of fidependson the choice of the time
unit, be. the interval over which we measure the growth of capacity;
we should expect this coefficient to be a proper fraction if we are
dealing with short intervals5 and to approach unity as the interval
lengthens.(It may be noted that if g is larger than one, is not
the same thing as the capacity actually on hand at the time the ex-
pansion decision occurs, but represents rather an approximate
measure of the capacity thçn on hand and under construction.In
fact, in view of the definition of g, capacity on hand at time t—1
must be either on hand or already in progress at time £—g.It is
possible, of course, to set up our model in terms of Kt...g; however,
the formulation of equation 2 is the most convenient for our present
purposes even if it is not the most refined.)
4. Finally it is assumed that under normal conditions the ex-
pected rate of output can be approximated reasonably well in
5Cf. Hicks, op. cit., p. 40.
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terms of the rate of output prevailing in the neighborhood of the
time at which the expectation is held;' i.e. that
(3) =
Thecoefficient j should be close to unity and is assumed reason-
ably stable over time; it may not be exactly unity, however, as it
may be affected by the long-run growth of the industry and the value
of g, and for this reason it may also be subject to some gradual
drift over time.7
Substitutingequation 3into equation 2 yields a hypothesis
which, aside from the parameters, involves only observable data of
the type used by Hickman, namely
(4) K —K=3(a —K) tt1 t—gt—g c—i
provided
(4a) a >K t—gt—g
If the condition 4a does not hold, then the acceleration principle
has very little to tell us as to what will happen to capacity except
that it should tend to decrease as worn-out or obsolete facilities
are retired and not replaced.8 But since the rate at which capacity
is retired depends on many factors, including the age distribution
of existing facilities, we should not expect any very close relation
betweentheamount of excess capacity at time t—g, namely
at_gOt__:Kt_i,and the amount of plant actually retired in the
coursethe year t.
Most of Hickman's analysis does not test our equation 4.Rather
it tests the hypothesis, which I shall label the "naive" acceler-
ation model, according to which addition to capacity is proportional
to the rate of change of output or,
(5) — = —
Thisnaive model can be gotten out of our models 4 and 4a but only
by introducing some further very special assumptions.
Assumptions:
5. $isunity, i.e. firms act instantaneously, or at least within a
year (which is the time unit of Hickman's data) to wipe out fully
any unbalance in capacity.
'ibid., p. 39.
'Cf. footnote 14.
6Cf. Hicks, op. cit., p. 44.
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6. g is zero, i.e. such actions aimed at adjusting capacity can
iroduce the desired result, so to speak, overnight; or alternatively
firms, having perfect foresight, are able at time t—g to predict
accurately.
7. Propositions 5 and 6 hold when capacity is too large as well
as when it is short.
8. a is constant over time.
Under these conditions equations 4 and 4a reduce to
This equation in turn implies
=aOt
(capacity is always optimally adjusted to current output) and there-
fore, finally, the "naive" model
K —K=aO —aO=a(O —0) t t—1 t t—1 t t—1
From a glance at the list of preposterous assumptions 5 to 8
which lead up to equation 5, one can hardly be surprised if Hick-
man's extensive tests show that this hypothesis is not well sup-
ported by the data.If anything, one may be rather astonished to
findthat, even inthis untenable formulation, the acceleration
principle is of some moderate help in explaining the behavior of
capacity.His Table 1 shows that, while capacity did not move in
the same direction as output every year, it did so for nearly two-
thirds of the nearly 450 observations. Nor is Hickman's attempt at
showing that this agreement is entirely explained by long-term trend
completely convincing. For one thing a close examination of panel
C of his table wjii reveal that the so-called "secular declines" of
the industries with "mixed" trends are indeed hardly more than cy-
clical developments connected with the depression of the 1930's
and prolonged by wartime restrictions of output or investments.
A second model tested by Hickman in panel B of Table 1 is ob-
tained by relaxing assumption 6 and recognizing that g may be dif-
ferent from zero, but retaining the other assumptions.This leads
to an equation of the form
(6) — =a
—
whereg is presumably related to the lengthof time intervening be-
tween decision to change to capacity and the carrying out of this
decision. In his table Hickman has reported results only for a value
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of g =1and these results represent indeed a slight improvement
(especially for the critical industties with mixed trends). There is
of course no reason why g should have the same value for all in-
dustries or why it should be the same when the desired change in
capacity is up as when it is down.However, it is on the whole
fortunate that no further efforts were spent by Hickman in testing
the naive acceleration model, for such efforts would have been
largely wasted.
If we want to carry out a meaningful and reasonably conclusive
test of the usefulness of the acceleration principle, it is the model
of equation 4 that needs to be tested.I do not wish to claim of
course that every supporter of the acceleration mechanism would
agree in every detail with the model I have set up or with the spe-
cific hypothesis I have used in deriving it. But I am quite confident
that most of them would agree that, as long as this model, or some
reasonable variation thereof, passes the empirical test, the useful-
ness of the acceleration principle in business cycle models is sub-
stantially vindicated.
It may be objected at this point that our model 4 looks pretty dif-
from the formulation to be found, say, in Sainuelson9 or hicks.
But the difference is, in reality, more one of appearance than of
substance. As I have tried to show, it results from spelling out in
greater detail what was implicit in the broad formulation, in order
to adjust the model to Hickman's type of data. As a matter of fact
it can readily be shown that if our equation 4 is inserted, say, in
Samuelson's classical model with but slight modifications, or in
Hicks' formal structure, the implications of these models are sub-
stantially unchanged.'°
944lnteraction Between the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of
Acceleration," Review of Economic Statistics, May 1939.
10To illustrate this point, take, for instance, Samuelson's model and
make consumption a function of current income.His first two equations
can then be written as (a) +and (b) aYe.Next, representing
by y the cost of increasing capacity by one dollar per unit of time, we can
write= —Ks_i)wheredenotes the capacity of the economy as a
whole (measured in dollars per unit of time) and y, with dimension time, corre-
sponds to the usual noLion of the acceleration coefficient.Making now
use of our equation 4, taking g1, and remembering that for the entire
economy output, 0, can be replaced by income, Y, we obtain in place of
'Samuelson'saccelerationequationthefollowing expression(c)
—Kg_i)bYe—i Since a is a pure number, both theco-
efficient by$a and ey$ are dimensionless, as noted in the text.
By substituting in equation (a) and carrying out appropriate manipula-
tions, one can readily derive frpm these three equations the second-order
differenceequation (d) +[b/(i—a)] — —[b/U--a)]
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At the same time. the explicit introduction of the notion of the
"speed of adjustment" in the formulation of the acceleration prin-
ciple may be quite helpful in clarifying certain points connected
with the choice of the time unit which are apt to lead to confusion.
Briefly the issue is this: as is well known, the acceleration co.
efficient (or capital coefficient) has dimension time and therefore
its numerical value depends on the unit of measurement for time.
Now, in the models based on the acceleration principle, the value
of the acceleration coefficient typically turns out to play a critical
role in determining whether the time path of aggregate output will
be damped or explosive.It would appear therefore that the stability
implications of a given model can be changed by the purely formal
trick of changing the choice of the time unit. Once we introduce
our "speed of adjustment" coefficient, this disturbing possibility
tends to disappear in that the stability of the system will generally
depend on the product of this coefficient and the conventional
acceleration coefficient and this product is independent of the
choice of the time unit (since the speed of adjustment has dimen-
sion 1/time)."
The above remarks have the further implication that a slow speed
of adjustment would tend to exert a stabilizing influence on the be-
havior of economic activity.This implication is, of course, not
surprising when one considers that a gradual adjustment reflects
the willingness of firms to tolerate short-term variations in the rate
of utilization of capacity, partly absorbing the shock of variations
in the flow of demand.
Hickman has not tested directly the model of equations 4 and 4a,
but his test of Table 7 comes reasonably close to doing so.This
can best be seen by dividing both sides of equations 4 and 4a by
which yields the equation
If we increase the value of g or change the lag in the consumption func-
tion, we merely get a difference equation of higher order; if we further take
into account the irreversibility of our ejuation 4a, add autonomous invest-
ments and ceiling, we are back at Hicks model.
"The notion of speed of adjustment can also be usefully introduced in
connection with inventory behavior, where the acceleration coefficient is
represented by the desired stock-sales ratio.This was actually done in a
previous joint contribution with Owen H. Sauerlender in which, among
other things, an attempt was made at securing a quantitative estimate of
this parameter (see Franco Modigliani and Owen H. Sauerlender, "Eco-
nomic Expectations and Plans of Firms in Relation to Short-Term Fore-
casting,"Short-Term EconomicForecasting,Studiesin Income and
Wealth, Volume Seventeen, Princeton University Press for National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1955, pp. 261—361, especially section 7).












Tosee the implications of equation 7, suppose that the "capital co-
efficient" a is approximately constant over the period of observa-
tion and that g =1;then the first term on the right side of 7 can be
writtenas where A =/3qais some constant and
represents the rate of utilization of capacity lagged one
year.In this form 7 says that the proportional growth of capacity
in any given year is an increasing linear function of the lagged rate
of utilization of capacity, provided 7a is satisfied, i.e. provided the
rate of utilization of capacity is above a certain critical level. Be-
low this level we should simply expect capacity to tend to decline
(or stay constant) but without any close association to the actual
rate of utilization.
The hypothesis actually tested by Hickman in Table 7 differs
from equation 7 in the following respects: (a) a is assumed con-
stantover time for all industries, (b) on the left-hand side the
"percentage" change of capacity is replaced by the amount of
change, — (c) only integral values of g have been tested,
and (d) for those industries for which g is different from unity the
quantity is replaced by Ot_g/Kt_ .Itis clear that these
differences, which arise from the failure of ¶Iickman to test a well-
defined basic model, are not overwhelming, so that the results of
his test do shed some tentative light on the tenability of hypothe-
sis 7.
It is apparent from Table 7 that our model stands up pretty well
under this approximate test.For every industry included, the aver-
age annual increase of capacity rises from a near zero or negative
figure corresponding to low levels of utilization to a much higher
positive figure corresponding to high levels of utilization.
One may wonder at this point how the model of equation 7 would
fare under a more direct test in which assumptions a to c are elimi-
nated.A partial answer to this question is provided in the table
below; the answer is only partial because the elimination of some
of the shortcomings of Hickman's test would require much more ex-
tensive work than would be warranted for the purpose of this modest
comment.
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TABLE 1
A Test of the "Acceleration Hypothesis" for Hickman's Data:
Yearly Percentage Change in Capacity in Relation to the



















Pig iron Less than 60 6 5 0—0.5 0.9
1915—1951 1 61—79 3 4 70.8 0.8
80andover 0 0 829 0.8
Steelingots Less than 50 4 2 00.2 0.5
1916—1951i451—69 2 1 6 1.1 1.0
70and over 0 0 16 4.1 15
Electrolytic Less than7012 4 0—0.7 1.0
copper if71—79 2 3 3 1.1 1.4
1908—1949 80.and over 0 0 11 6.0 1.8
Petroleum Less than 70 2 0 4 1.2 2.3
refining if71—80 2 0 54.6 3.3
1925—1949 81 and over 0 0 75.2 2.3
By-product Less than 54 4 0 0—0.4 0.2
coke 55—78 2 3 51.2 1.2
1921—1949
2
78and over 0 2 8 3.6 2.3
Paper Less than 64 1 1 0—0.9 0.9
1919—1950 65—75 0 2 3 1.8 1.2
76and over 1 0 20 5.3 2.3
Portland Less than 50 7 2 1—0.9 0.7
cement if51—64 2 1 6 1.7 1.7
191 1—1949 65 and over 0 0 165.0 2.7
Lessthan 49 1 2 2 0.1 2.8
explosivesa 2 50—62 2 2 3 0.8. 1.5
1924—1951 63and over 2 0 6 1.9 1.6
Black blast- Lessthan42 12 1 5—5.2 8.3
ingpowderifOver42 2 0 3 2.1 3.7
1924—1951
Beehive coke Less than 6227 1 3—4.9 6.4
1909—1949ifOver62 1 0 3 1.7 2.9
aExciudes 1940, 1947, and1948 (see text). —
Inorder to prepare our Table 1, scatter diagrams were made just
like those described by Hickman, but with certain modifications
discussed below:
1. As the dependent variable we have used the percentage change
in capacity and as the independent variable the quantity 01K t—gt1
as required by equation 7.
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2. In addition to integral lags, also lags of one-half and one and
one-half years were considered, when this appeared desirable from
the data and other considerations.12
3. The years of "infancy" of the industry, if any were covered
by the data, were eliminated.In these years growth does not re-
flect the acceleration mechanism but primarily the gradual estab-
lishrnent of the industry; in other words in flicks' language we are
dealing here not with acceleration-induced investment but, es-
sentially, with autonomous investments.There were only two in-
dustries, and a few years, for which such an elimination appeared
iiidicated.Specifically we eliminated, for beehive coke, the years
1912—1920 in the course of which output increased some three and
one-half times, and, for petroleum refining, the years 1918—1924,
during which output approximately doubled.It should be noted that,
had these observations been included, our table would still show
that the rate of addition to capacity increases with the lagged rate
of utilization since in these years the rate of utilization was, of
course, generally high.Bowever, the inclusion of these observa-
tions would have considerably distorted the figures of the table by
giving an exaggerated impression of the rate of growth at high
levels of utilization.
4. The scatter diagram for each industry was examined for evi-
dence of significant trends in a, the desirable rate of utilization of
capacity; clearly, if such a trend is present, the scatter diagram
has to be replaced by a more elaborate one. A marked rising trend
in the desirable rate was found for electric power. This result was
expected on the basis of a nearly completed intensive study of in-
vestment in this industry carried out jointly with Avram Kisselgoff.
Incidentally, this study partly inspires this comment.Because of
the woblems created by this trend and because this industry will
be thoroughly covered in the above-mentioned study, our table
eludes electric utilities.It will suffice to indicate at this point
that the above-mentioned trend can be readily explained in terms of
technological and other changes and that our study finds impressive
evidence of the working of the accelerator mechanism for this in-
12When the lag is, say, one and one-half years, the dependent variable
should be Ot_(3/2)/Kt... 1 which, with the data available, could be ap-
proximated by (Os— l +Ot—2)/2Kt_ i;for reasons of computational ex-
pediency the approximation actually used was Vg [(Os- 1 + °t—2 /
2)].Sincetypically changes very slowly from year to year, this
approximation cannot significantly distort the results and can be defended
also on other &ounds. A similar procedure was used for testing half-year
lags, which was done only for the paper industry.
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dustry.13 Some evidence of an increasing trend in the optimum rate
was also found for petroleum refining, and this finding too seems to
be supported by the technological history of this industry.How-
ever, since this trend was not marked after the first few years,
which had been eliminated anyhow, the figures presented in Table 1
are based on the assumption that a was in fact constant; this may
partly account for the fact that the results for this industry are
somewhat poorer than for most of the remaining ones.There was
some evidence of a decreasing trend in a (or in for some other
industriesbut, except for cotton spinning (see footnote 16) the
trend appeared small enough to be neglected for the purpose of our
rough test.
5. The years 1942-1946 were eliminated for all industries be-
cause of war conditions and especially because of restrictions on
expansion of capacity.In addition, for one industry—permissible
and other high explosives—the three years 1940, 1947, and 1948
were al8o excluded.In the first of these years the large increase
in capacity is obviously due to factors not included in our model.
The remaining two years were eliminated because the reliability of
the data appeared very doubtful. In the first of these years capacity
is supposed to have increased by 20.6 per cent and in the immedi-
ately following year, 1948, it is supposed to have decreased by
11.6 per cent, while the largest increase in any other year was 10
per cent (in 1940) and the largest decrease 6 per cent.It should
be noted in this connection that the estimates of change in ca-
pacity used in Hickman's and our own test may be subject to con-
siderable error since they are obtained by taking the first differ-
ence of the capacity sei:ies.While the capac.ity estimates may be
substantially accurate, any short-term error in these estimates gets,
of course, tremendously magnified in the first differences.There
are several instances in which the change-in-capacity series be-
haves in a suspiciously erratic fashion; however, the case referred
to above was so conspicuous as to suggest that the observations
in question should be disregarded.
Following Hickman, we selected from the scatter diagrams with
the appropriate lag, for each industry, three representative ranges
of utilization of capacity.The first of these is the "low" or ex-
cess capacity range, of which we give in our table only the upper
value; this value represents, of course, an estimate of the quantity
'3This last conclusion can, in fact, be anticipated from an inspection of
the results reported for electric power in Hickman's Table 7, in spite of
the limitations of this table.
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of equation 7a."In this range, which, as we should expect
from our model, stands out rather clearly for every industry, ca-
pacity mostly decreases or increases but slightly (less than 1 per
cent) except for a very few "erratic" observations.In the next
range, the middle or "critical" range, capacity rises moderately,
typically between 1 and 2 per cent on the average. But what prima-
rily characterizes this range is that, for many industries, behavior
is somewhat variable as is revealed by the average deviation re-
produced in the last column; the "coefficient of deviation" (the
ratio of the average deviation to the mean) is typically much larger
in this range than in the high utilization range.18 Presumably this
is the area in which the many factors that are not included in the
acceleration mechanism, and which are especially significant for
individualindustries or firms, have an opportunity to play the
largest role.Finally there is a high utilization range in which ca-
pacity increases substantially and with hardly any exception. The
average yearly growth varies substantially, of course, from industry
to industry reflecting differential underlying growth trends. As one
might expect, this range is absent for the last two industries of
Table 1, which are declining industries.16
"There is no reason to be disturbed by the fact that the estimated
critical rate is everywhere less than unity (or' 100 per cent) and that it
varies substantially from industry to industry.In the first place the co-
efficient a measures, essentially, the ratio of the "technologically opti-
mum" to the "economically desirable" rate of utilization of capacity; and,
as pointed out by Hickman in the first section of his paper and by Chenery
(op.cit., section 1), there is no reason why this ratio should be unity.
Furthermore, as we have indicated, the coefficientneednot be unity
either.The fact that the critical rate of utilization depends onas well
as on a is worth noting; it reflects the fact that in a growing industry a
simple and effective way of handling the problems arising from lack of
precise information on the future course of sales consists in endeavoring
to provide at all times a certain margin of spare capacity over and above
that required by current rates of output.For a fuller discussion of this
point the reader is referred to the forthcoming study of the electric power
industry referred to earlier.
"This result would,ofcourse, betrivialifthe regression were
homoscedastic.But in the present case one might have rather expected,
on a priori grounds, that the dispersion would increase roughly in propor-
tion to the mean.In fact the dispersion tends to increase, but proportion-
ately less than the mean; nor is this result accounted for in general by the
differences in the range of the "independent" variable over which the
mean and dispersion is computed.
"The remaining two industries classified as declining by Hickman are
not included in the table.In one of them, cotton spinning, there is clearly
a very marked upward trend in the optimum rate of utilization a due to the
increased use of multiple shifts.Since such trends cannot be readily
handled with the simple technique here employed, this industry was not
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It is pretty clear from the table that, as far as this test goes, the
acceleration model stands up remarkably well against the "facts"
collected by Hickman.Needless to say, even our test is still a
rather crude and rudimentary one.A more refined test would re-
quire the use of methods of correlation analysis and should involve
numerical estimates of the parameters of equation 7.These pa-
rameters are of considerable theoretical interest and, furthermore,
their reasonableness could and should be checked against techno-
logical and other information relating to each industry.Also, in
carrying out such a test, the very general formulation of equations
4 and 4a should be refined and adjusted to fit the specific techno-
logicaland economic conditionscharacterizing each industry.
Finally the test should endeavor to include factors other than the
simple acceleration mechanism (such as the cost of securing in-
vestment funds, price-cost relations, more direct measures of ex-
pected demand, etc.) and try to assess quantitatively the extent to
which these other factors can improve the explanation of behavior
provided by the simple acceleration mechanism, This is precisely
the type of analysis that has been carried out in the study of the
electricutilityindustryto which reference was made earlier.
The application of this painstaking and time-consuming type of
analysis to Hickman's data is clearly beyond the scope of this
brief comment. However, some preliminary efforts in this direction,
on which I hope to report elsewhere, do suggest that the results of
such analysis will be far more illuminating and useful than those
obtained from the "wholesale" type of approach underlying Hick-
man's paper and this comment.
Pending these desirable refinements I feel that the results pre-
sented in Hickman's Table 7 and in my own Table 1 are quite ade-
quate to substantiate the claim made at the beginning of this com-
ment, to wit, that the acceleration principle, in the formulation
underlying the recent work of I-licks and others, represents indeed
a fruitful hypothesis in explaining the behavior of investment in
fixed capital.
HAROLD J. BARNETT, Resources for the Future, Inc.
I hope that when capital coefficient studies for all industries are
brought together and published in final form an effort will be made
analyzed.In the remaining one, wheat flour, the rate of utilization of ca-
pacity (and capacity itself) remained extremely stable up to 1941 (a mini-
mum of 50 per cent and a maximum of less than 60 per cent), while in the
postwar period the last three of the five observations are not comparable
with the rest of the series because of a change in the definition of ca-
pacity (ef. Hickman's Appendix A).
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to distinguish the cases that rest on ex ante estimates of plant
capital inputs, costs, and capacities from those that rest on ex post
analysis of construction and operating records.The former! based
for example on Korean War and some World War II applications for
accelerated amortization or federal loans, are before-the-fact esti-
mates made by the applicant firms; the latter are based on such
data as the voluminous Defense Plant Corporation (Plancor) files.
Except where applications resulted in actual plant construction and
operation andtheinput-output analysts examined the ex post rec-
ords, errors will be present for several reasons, among them mis-
leading estimates and honest errors by the applicant, and incomplete
or too gross presentations.I raise this point not to suggest that ex
ante data should not have been used—I was party to deciding that
there was no other recourse—but rather to point up a possibly seri-
otis deficiency that I hope will eventually be corrected.
These capital coefficient studies did not make this distinction
clear, but except for this they have been sufficiently self-critical.
.1 see no need to catalogue their virtues and defects or to describe
their use in the Leontief input-output model.Instead I shall try to
suggest that this type of information, while compiled as part of a
larger input-output effort, forms a valuable body of data for use in
non-input-output economic analysis.The simplest way to suggest
this is to identify major areas of economic analysis in which the
capital information can be significantly productive.
Capital Accumulation andProductivity
Economists' interest in capital accumulation and capital pro-
ductivity and their relationships to economic stability and economic
growth is long-standing and durable.We observe it in Marxist,
Keynesian, and other underconsumption literaturein connection
withcyclical and long-term analysis;inthecontributions of
Aftalion, Clark, and Saniuelson, among others, on the accelerator
relation and its effect on business cycles; in recent contributions
byHarrod, Domar, Schelling, Alexander, Coim, Fellner, et al,
aswell as by the past Council of Economic Advisers,to the
question of what is a maintainable rate of capital accumulation. As
Domar said of the annual capital formation of $36 billion,
"many an economist has wondered how much longer the economy
will be able to absorb capital at this rapid rate, and what will hap-
pen when a drastic fall in capital formation takes place."t
tEvsey D. Domar, "The Problem of Capital Accumulation," American
Economic Review, December 1948, p. 777.
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Consider, as an example, the Domar formulation, that (as a very
simplified proposition) "axs is the required rate of growth of in-
come which is needed to prevent an excessive accumulation of
where a is the (long-run) propensity to save and s is the
ratio of output (measured in terms of value added) to capital; Domar
estimates a level of a, the propensity to save, but (as of 1948) can
only look forward hopefully to data for s, the ratio of output to
capital.Such data, requiring a certain amount of work, it is true, to
transform them to the Doniar s are now at hand in the capital co-
efficient studies of the interindustry program. For example, cursory
examination of the industrial capital coefficients I have at hand
indicates a ratio of annual capacity to capital in the general neigh-
borhood of 2; this, of course, overlooks nonindustrial investment
Multiply by 0.4 or 0.5 (rough ratios of manufacturing value added to
manufacturing value of output for the industrial classification of
these capital coefficients) and get about 1 as a very crude approxi-
mation of Domar's definition of s.Multiplying this value of s with
his estimate of a of 10 to 12 per cent, we have axs equal to 10 to
12 per cent, the required annual rate of growth of income needed to
prevent an excessive accumulation of capital, assuming all savings
are allocated to income generating investment. This is a very high
rate and would be high relative to present annual income growth
conceptions of 2.5 and 3 per cent for the United States, even if the
estimate were wrong by a factor of 2.Surely it would be worthwhile
to exploit input-output capital coefficients carefully in connection
with the appraisals of economic growth rates of the United States
and foreign countries, including, the USSR, on which the National
Bureau oi Economic Research has recently launched a new large
project.In such exploitation I suggest that it is essential to ex-
ploit the detailed nature of these interindustry capital studies. For
example it is necessary to improve the definition of Domar's s in
several ways, among them by taking account of the extent to which
s varies depending on the industry in which the capital is invested.
I think it is unnecessary for me to show how these data are di-
rectly useful for accelerator relation analysis other than to point
out that, because of the capital coefficients now available, the
accelerator can be a vector instead of a single number.
Industrial Location and Regional Economic Growth
From such capital and capacity studies we obtain insight into at
least one reason for the strong tendency for industries to grow
2lbid.,p. 781.
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where they are.The basic data demonstrate that it is almost al-
ways possible for an existing plant to create an increment of addi-
tional capacity at a cost less than that of a new plant built at an
entirely separate location.In part this is because the plant was
intentionally (with an eye on future expansion) or unavoidably (on
account of indivisibilities or errors) constructed with excess actual
or potential capacities in certain departments. And in part this is
is because, even though a plant is constructed with exactly equal
capacities in each department, differential technological advances
inthevarious departments work to create disparities as time
passes.In either case, and in others producing the same resuit,
we learn from capital studies such as these that a large fraction of
growth in capacity takes place by "unbalanced" expansion of exist-
ing plants on or near their present sites.
The capital studies at hand fall far short of settling these in-
dustrial-location and regional-growth questions, of course, but they
suggest new research, and they offer for such research more than
just bare hypotheses but rather a substantial body of pertinent,
organized data.
Further Study of Capital
The detailed character of the capital-coefficients work indicates
approximately the particular forms of the investment goods.This
opens paths for a variety of further capital studies: study of the
convertibility of capital, including linear-programing exploitation of
the data; examination of economists' concepts of maintenance, de-
preciation,and obsolescence in terms of the particular capital
goods subject to them; illumination of (if it is susceptible to ii-
luniination) the distinction between capital widening and capital
deepening, which has interested some theorists; measurement of
capital economies of scale; and inquiry into the time path and total
time involved in the investment process of expanding capacity at
existing and new sites.I find this last area particularly promising
because I believe it will be found that many industries can expand
capacity as fast as demand growth, cushioned by inventories., calls
for increased output. To the extent that this is true, in many cases
firms have the opportunity of meeting increase in demand at un-
changed or lower cost by increasing capacity instead of operating
on the rising portion oi a static cost curve.
Other Applications
The availability of these capital data makes a number of other
areas of economic analysis subject to improved research.One is
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appraisal of the particular existing producers' goods on which re-
search, invention, and innovation can be expected to impinge. An-
otheris analysis of certain market structures and organizations;
similarities of capital and technology among different industries, as-
certained from these capital data, sometimes characterize prospects
for both possible future competition and possible future coinbina-
tion.For these cases it thus becomes possible to analyze the
problem of entry in terms of specific capital requirements and tech-
nical know-how.Another is interregional comparisons of tech-
nologies as embodied in capital accounts. Yet another is economic
levelopment analysis, which has always been hungry for information
on which capital inputs at what Costs are needed to increase ca-
pacity.Finally, analysis in the areas of civil defense, the conse-
quences of hypothetical airattack,and recuperation obviously need
these capital data.
REPLY BY MR. GR0ssE, The Rand Corporation
Harold J. Barnett very properly raises the question of whether
the data on capital expenditures and capacity increases derived
from applications for accelerated amortization are reliable, and
points out that some of these are before-the-fact estimates.His
suggestion that ex ante and ex post data be identified in future
publications is a good one.In the meantime I want to add a few
general notes on this problem.
For almost all plants, the data on capacity expansion were engi-
neers' estimates. The few exceptions are those where capacity in-
formation was implied by wartime production records.In an effort
to check the accuracy of the engineers' estimates of capacity, the
Bureau of the Census studied production records for 1941—1943 for
a sample of sixty-eight plant expansions used in Harvard TJni-
versity's analysis of the chemical industries. This study indicated
about three-fourths of the expansions in production were within 1].
per cent of the estimates made, by the engineers, as shown in the
table below.
With regard to the cost information, the data from World War II
records are, with trivial exceptions, actual expenditures. Data from
current applications, on the other hand, are for the most part ex
ante estimates. The relative importance of the two sources is not
uniform in the industry studies.In some, as for copper mining, rec-
ords from both time periods were used, while in others the coeffi-
cients were based on World War II information only, as for chemi-
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Production Increases in Relationship to Projected Changes in





1—5.9 10 11 21
6—10.9 7 1 8
11—15.9 4 4
16—20.9 2 3 5






51 or higher 3 3
Total 29 19 68
Source: Production data from Census Form CMR-102A.Capacity data
from certificate of necessity.
cals, or current information oniy, as in cement.In using the in-
dustry reports as they now stand, a check on the time period from
which the data were drawn can serve as a guide to whether the cost
data are ex ante or ex post.
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